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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
Case No. CV 12-06764 JGB (AJWx) Date: March 20, 2013 
Title: TODD BURTON -v- TIME WARNER CABLE INC.
===============================================================
PRESENT: HONORABLE JESUS G. BERNAL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Maynor Galvez None Present
Courtroom Deputy Court Reporter
PROCEEDINGS: ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 10)
(IN CHAMBERS)
On March 18, 2013, a hearing was held on Defendant Time Warner Cable
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) (Doc. No. 10) against Plaintiff Todd Burton, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.  Having considered all papers and
the arguments presented at the hearing in support of and in opposition to the MTD,
the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
//
//
I. BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff Todd Burton (“Burton”) brings this class action against Defendant Time
Warner Cable, Inc. (“TWC”).  On August 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
TWC continues to indefinitely maintain personally identifiable information on all of its
previous customers.  (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 2.)  In addition, Plaintiff alleges that
TWC fails to send annual privacy notices to former customers informing them that
TWC continues to retain their information.  (Compl., ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff claims he signed up for cable services with TWC on or about August
2002.  (Compl., ¶ 35.)  In order to activate his service, Plaintiff avers that TWC
required him to provide various forms of personally identifiable information (“PII”),
including his address, home and work telephone numbers, social security number,
and credit card information.  (Compl., ¶ 35.)  Plaintiff cancelled his Time Warner
service in or about December 2009.  (Compl., ¶ 36.)  Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n
information and belief,” TWC still retains Plaintiff’s PII.  (Compl., ¶ 37.)  Moreover,
Plaintiff alleges he has never received notice from TWC informing him that it still
retains his PII.  (Compl., ¶ 38.)
TWC provides cable television, DVR, and digital phone services.  (Compl., ¶
18.)  Plaintiff alleges that TWC requests that subscribers provide several forms of PII
in order to receive cable service.  (Compl., ¶ 19.)  Plaintiff alleges that once TWC
obtains PII, it maintains a digital record system with every subscriber’s personal
information.  (Compl., ¶ 20.)  Plaintiff cites TWC’s Privacy Policy which provides that:
“TWC maintain[s] personally identifiable information about subscribers
for as long as it is necessary for business purposes.  This period of time
may last as long as you are a subscriber, and if necessary, for additional
time so that we can comply with tax, accounting and other legal
requirements.  When information is no longer needed for these
purposes, it is our policy to destroy or anonymize it.”
(Compl., ¶ 21.)  Plaintiff claims TWC fails to destroy PII after it is no longer needed,
and instead, retains consumers’ PII indefinitely.  (Compl., ¶ 22.)  In addition, Plaintiff
alleges, TWC fails to provide privacy notices to customers whose accounts have
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been closed, but whose PII is still retained by TWC. (Compl., ¶ 24.) 
 
Plaintiff brings five claims on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
against Defendant TWC.  Plaintiff brings claim one under 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) of the
Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”).  (Compl., ¶¶ 50-50.)  Plaintiff brings
claim one on behalf of a class defined as: “All persons in the United States who
signed up for cable service with Time Warner, and whose personally identifiable
information was retained by Time Warner after the termination of services.”
(“Retention Class,” Compl., ¶ 39.)  Claim two alleges TWC failed to provide yearly
privacy notices to former customers as required by § 551(a) of the CCPA.  (Compl.,
¶¶ 61-70.)  Claim two is brought on behalf of the “Notice Class” defined as: “All
persons in the United States who signed up for cable service with Time Warner, and
who were never issued annual written notices from Time Warner regarding Time
Warner’s retention or disclosure fo their personally identifiable written information.” 
(Compl., ¶ 40.)  
Claims three, four, and five are brought on behalf of the “California State
Class” defined as “All persons residing in the State of California who signed up for
cable service with Time Warner, and whose personally identifiable information was
retained by Time Warner after the termination of service.”  (Compl., ¶ 41.)  Claim
three alleges TWC violated of Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.8 under the California
Customer Records Act (“CCRA”).  (Compl., ¶¶ 71-80.)  Claim four alleges that TWC
breached an implied contract between the California State Class and TWC. 
(Compl., ¶¶ 81-92.)  Finally, claim five alleges violation of Cal. Penal Code § 637.5. 
(Compl., ¶¶ 93-101.)
On September 17, 2012, TWC filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  (MTD, Doc. Nos. 10. 11.)  TWC also
filed a Request for Judicial Notice of four documents.  (“RJN,” Doc. No. 12.)  Plaintiff
filed an opposition to the MTD on December 17, 2012.  (Opp’n, Doc. No. 24.)  TWC
replied on February 8, 2013.  (Reply, Doc. No. 34.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to bring a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Rule 12(b)(6) is
read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires only a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that the Federal Rules require
that a plaintiff provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).  When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all
material allegations in the complaint – as well as any reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them – as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC
Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v.
Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994).
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his
'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."  Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citations omitted).  Rather, the allegations in the complaint "must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level."  Id.  
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  "The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.  Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).  The Ninth Circuit has clarified that (1) a complaint must "contain
sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the
opposing party to defend itself effectively," and (2) "the factual allegations that are
taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair
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to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and
continued litigation."  Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).   
Although the scope of review is limited to the contents of the complaint, the
Court may also consider exhibits submitted with the complaint, Hal Roach Studios,
Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), and "take
judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings," Mir v. Little Co. of
Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988).
B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1)
An Article III federal court must ask whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient
injury to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution.  To satisfy Article III standing, plaintiff must allege: (1) an injury in fact
that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual and imminent; (2) that the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely
(not merely speculative) that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81
(2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).  A suit brought
by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a “case or controversy,” and an Article
III federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.  Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).  In that event, the suit
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).  See id. at 109–110.  At least one named
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact.  See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy
with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member
of the class.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Request for Judicial Notice
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TWC requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following four
documents: (a) Time Warner Cable Residential Services Subscriber Agreement
(“Subscriber Agreement,” Doc. No. 12-1, Exh. A); (b) Time Warner Cable Subscriber
Privacy Notice (“Privacy Notice,” Doc. No. 12-2, Exh. B); (c) Class Action Complaint,
Bayer et al. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-02826-JCS (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2012) (“Comcast Complaint,” Doc. No. 12-3, Exh. C); and (d) Class
Action Complaint, Hodsdon et al. v. DirectTV, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-02827-JSW (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2012) (“Direct TV Complaint,” Doc. No. 12-4, Exh. D).  (RJN, Doc. No.
12.)  
  
Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on
a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.  Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688
(9th Cir.2001).  However, “[a] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public
record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,”
as long as the facts noticed are not “subject to reasonable dispute.”  Intri–Plex
Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting
Lee, 250 F.3d at 689).  Plaintiff has not opposed Defendant’s request or disputed the
authenticity of these documents.
The Court GRANTS TWC’s requests for judicial notice of the four documents. 
The Court may take judicial notice of “documents whose contents are alleged in a
complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically
attached to the pleading . . . .”  Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994)
(overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119
(9th Cir. 2002).)  The complaint directly quotes from the Privacy Notice, but does not
attach the document as an exhibit.  (Compl., ¶ 21.)  Therefore, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s request to take judicial notice of the Privacy Notice.  The complaint also
alleges that Plaintiff entered into an implied contract with TWC by “subscrib[ing] to
Time Warner’s cable service.”  (Compl., ¶ 82.)  At other points in the complaint,
Plaintiff claims he and the putative class “signed up for,” “purchased,” or
“subscribed” to TWC’s cable services.   (Compl., ¶ 35, 56, 66, 77, 99.)  Defendant
asserts, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that subscribers to TWC’s cable service are
governed by the Subscriber Agreement.  (RJN at 3.)   Since the Subscriber
Agreement is central to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for
judicial notice.  See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998)
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(“Although we have yet to apply [the Branch] rule to documents crucial to the
plaintiff's claims, but not explicitly incorporated in his complaint, such an extension is
supported by the policy concern underlying the rule: Preventing plaintiffs from
surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately omitting references to documents
upon which their claims are based . . . .”).  The Court also GRANTS Defendant’s
request to judicially notice the Comcast Complaint and DirectTV Complaint because
they are matters of public record.  See Hanson v. Firmat, 272 F. App'x 571, 572 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts may take judicial notice of documents in the public record.”);
Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 fn. 6 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”).
B. Voluntary Dismissal of Implied Contract Claim
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff has abandoned his fourth claim for
breach of implied contract.  In that claim, Plaintiff alleged that when he and the
members of the California Class provided their personal data to TWC they entered
into an implied contract.  (Compl., ¶ 83.)  As part of that implied contract, Plaintiff
alleges that TWC was obligated to comply with industry standards, including
retention and disposal policies for Plaintiff’s PII.  (Compl., ¶¶ 83-85.)  In addition,
Plaintiff asserts that the laws existing at the time and place of the contract, including
the CCPA and the CCRA, were incorporated into the implied contract.  (Compl., ¶
86.)
In its MTD, TWC submits that the Subscriber Agreement and Privacy Notice
are the “express contract[s] govern[ing] TWC’s obligations with regard to subscriber
data.”  (MTD at 16; RJN, Exhs. A, B.)  Therefore, Plaintiff’s implied contract claim
cannot survive because an express contract governs the same subject matter. 
Roots Ready Made Garments Co. v. Gap, Inc., 405 Fed. App’x. 120, 123 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indem. Co., 44 Cal.App.4th 194,
203 (1996).
On these grounds, Plaintiff agrees to voluntarily dismiss his implied contract
claim.  (Opp’n at 22 n.14.)  Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend the complaint to
replace the implied contract claim with one for breach of the express contract under
the Subscriber Agreement and Privacy Notice.  (Id.)  Since, for the reasons
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discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff must replead the other allegations in
the complaint to survive Rule 12(b)(1), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for
leave to amend his complaint to plead a breach of express, as opposed to implied,
contract.   Plaintiff shall amend the implied contract claim in conjunction with the
amendments described below.  The Court will not address any of the arguments
TWC put forth in its MTD as to the implied contract claim, or the potentially amended
express contract claim, until that claim is properly before the Court.
C. Article III Standing
Plaintiff’s four remaining claims are statutory.  Plaintiff pleads two claims under
CCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 551 for retention of PII and lack of notice.  The final two are state
law claims for retention of PII under the CCRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.8 and the Cal.
Penal Code § 637.5.  Plaintiff seeks damages as a remedy for all four claims.
TWC moves to dismiss these claims on the basis that: (1) Plaintiff lacks Article
III standing under Rule 12(b)(1); (2) Plaintiff fails to allege an injury sufficient to
establish statutory standing under Rule 12(b)(6); (3) the complaint is conclusory or
implausible; and (4) Plaintiff’s claims under § 551(a) and the CCRA fail as a matter
of law.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue his
claims, it does not reach TWC’s second, third, or fourth arguments for dismissal.
1. Injury
To establish Article III standing, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he satisfies
three irreducible requirements: (1) he has suffered an “injury in fact,” i.e., “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) the injury is “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) it is “likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations, quotation marks, and
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alterations omitted); accord Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).  In a
class action, named plaintiffs representing a class “must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 289 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).  Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the second and third
requirements of constitutional standing.  Solely at issue is whether Plaintiff has
properly alleged injury-in-fact.
The injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”  Edwards v. First Am. Corp.,
610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)). In such cases, the “standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or
statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.”  Id. (quoting Warth, 422
U.S. at 500).  Although “Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing,” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n. 3 (1997), a plaintiff may be able to
establish constitutional injury in fact by pleading a violation of a right conferred by
statute so long as he can allege that the injury he suffered was specific to him, see
Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.  Thus, the Court must look to the statutes to determine
whether they prohibited TWC’s conduct.  If they did, Plaintiff has demonstrated an
injury-in-fact.  See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 517.
The CCPA, CCRA and Cal. Penal Code prohibit the retention of personal
information by businesses, and, more specifically in the case of the CCPA and
CCRA, cable operators.  The CCPA also mandates that cable operators provide
notice regarding the PII previously collected.  Each statute explicitly creates a private
right of action for claims of retention and failure to provide notice.  See 47 U.S.C. §
551(f)(1) (“Any person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation of this
section may bring a civil action . . . .”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84(b) (“Any customer
injured by a violation of this title may institute a civil action to recover damages.”);
Cal. Penal Code § 637.5(i) (“Any aggrieved person may commence a civil action for
damages for invasion of privacy . . . .”).  By alleging a violation of these statutorily
created rights, Plaintiff satisfies Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. 
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TWC argues that the alleged statutory violations are insufficient to overcome
the Article III standing requirement because each statute requires an independent
injury resulting from the violation.  TWC points to the use of the words “aggrieved”
and “injured” in the private right of action provisions to support their argument that
an injury apart from the statutory violation must be alleged to establish Article III
standing.  (MTD at 6-7.)  However, Ninth Circuit case law directly refutes TWC’s
argument.
In Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit
held that alleged violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (“FISA”) were sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact for constitutional standing. 
The private right of action provisions for the FISA and SCA both include the term
“aggrieved,” nevertheless, the court found that they conferred a concrete injury.  Id.
at 908 (“SCA provides that ‘any provider of electronic communication service,
subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter’ may maintain
a civil action if the violation was done knowingly or intentionally.”) (emphasis added). 
In accordance with Jewel, the Court does not find that the inclusion of the words
“aggrieved” or “injured” in the statutory language changes the outcome of the injury
inquiry. Thus, Plaintiff has articulated harm which is sufficient to constitute an injury
for the purposes of Article III standing.  See also Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 11-CV-
01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (holding a violation of the
SCA sufficient to confer injury); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL
2119193, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (“Plaintiffs establish an injury (and
standing) by alleging a violation of [the Video Privacy Protection Act] statute” which
includes the term “aggrieved” in the subsection granting a private right of action).
Jewel goes so far as to state that the Article III  requirement that the injury be
“concrete” can exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights.  Jewel. 673 F.3d
at 908.  Thus, the alleged violations of the CCPA, CCRA and California Penal Code
satisfy the requirement that Plaintiff allege a concrete injury.  Id. at 909.
a. Particularized and Actual or Imminent
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A finding that statutory violations constitute a concrete injury does not end the
Article III standing inquiry.  Plaintiff’s injury must also be “particularized” as well as
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (examining
whether the plaintiffs established that the injury was sufficiently particularized and
actual or imminent after finding that a violation of a statute created an injury); Gaos
v. Google Inc., 5:10-CV-4809 EJD, 2012 WL 1094646, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,
2012) (same).  Lujan further defines that “[b]y particularized, we mean that the injury
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
n.1.  Plaintiff must therefore allege a particularized and actual or imminent injury
resulting from TWC’s alleged retention of Plaintiff’s PII and its failure to provide him
with notice that TWC retained this information.
The Court finds that the Complaint fails to identify an injury that is actual or
imminent and particularized.  Plaintiff claims to have suffered three specific injuries
as a result of TWC’s retention of his PII and the failure to issue timely notices.  The
Court addresses each of these proffered injuries in turn.  The Court recognizes that
there is no Ninth Circuit authority directly on point on the issue presented here. 
However, several U.S. District Courts in this Circuit have thoroughly addressed
similar issues that are instructive.1
1 On March 12, 2013, Plaintiff provided the Court with notice of a recent
decision in Freas v. RCN Corp., No. 12 C 4254 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2012).  (Doc. No.
38.)  Plaintiff attached a transcript of oral argument held before Judge Feinerman in
the Northern District of Illinois.  (Transcript, Doc. No. 38-1.)  The Court notes that the
Freas court faced the same issues under Section 551 of the Cable Act and found
that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts to confer Article III standing.  (Transcript at
36-37.)  However, the Freas decision is merely persuasive authority, as it is a
holding by district court outside of the Ninth Circuit.
In this instance, the Court finds that Freas is only minimally persuasive, as it
relies on a Seventh Circuit decision, Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672
F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2012), which implicitly held that an “enormously attenuated” injury
could be established solely from the failure to destroy private information lawfully
obtained and not disclosed.  Id. at 538.  No similar Ninth Circuit decision exists.  In
(continued...)
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i. Lack of Control Harm
First, Plaintiff alleges that TWC’s actions have deprived him of his “ability to
make informed decisions with respect to [his] privacy.”  (Compl., ¶¶ 55, 65, 76, 98.) 
The Court finds that this alleged injury is highly attenuated.  Although not clearly
described in Plaintiff’s complaint or opposition, the Court infers that Plaintiff contends
that since TWC retains Plaintiff’s PII, Plaintiff is unable to informatively decide how to
use his own personal information.  Unless there is some allegation of disclosure or
improper use of Plaintiff’s PII, it is unclear how TWC’s alleged retention of Plaintiff’s
PII affects his ability to make informed privacy decisions regarding his personal
information.  Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged which, if any, privacy decisions were
impaired by TWC’s retention.  Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a link between
TWC’s acts and his injury to move it from hypothetical to actual.  See Birdsong v.
Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding lack of standing because
the alleged injury was “conjectural and hypothetical”).
To the extent Plaintiff’s proffered injury is intended to redress the harm created
by TWC’s failure to provide a privacy notice, this argument was decided by the court
in Boorstein v. Men’s Journal LLC, CV 12-771 DSF EX, 2012 WL 2152815 (C.D.
1(...continued)
fact, several district courts in the Circuit have held that plaintiff had not established
an actual and particularized injury where defendant collected, tracked, or even
disclosed plaintiff’s personal information.  See, e.g.,  LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc.,
SACV 10-1256 GW JCGX, 2011 WL 1661532, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011); Low
v. LinkedIn Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). 
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, the theory that an injury-in-fact exists where defendant
merely retains plaintiff’s personal information is even less plausible.
Similarly, the Freas court relied on a Seventh Circuit decision, In re Aqua Dots
Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2011), where the court found
that allegations under a benefit of the bargain theory of damages can satisfy Article
III standing.  In Section C.1.a.ii infra, the Court finds that this theory of economic
harm is not viable under district court case law in the Ninth Circuit.
Due to the substantial difference in precedent, the Court finds that the Freas
decision does not compel a similar outcome here.
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Cal. June 14, 2012).  Under this theory, Plaintiff alleges his ability to make informed
decisions regarding his privacy was harmed by TWC’s failure to provide a statutorily
required privacy notice informing him that it maintained his PII.  In Boorstein, the
court noted that the law only recognizes such an “informational injury” where the
plaintiff has requested information and has subsequently been denied it.  Id. at *3. 
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he requested that TWC provide him with a privacy
notice or asked it to disclose the PII it retains.  Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged
a particularized informational injury resulting from TWC’s failure to provide a privacy
notice.
Plaintiff’s theory of injury due to lack of notice can also be rejected on the
basis that it constitutes a “mere procedural injury.”  Boorstein, 2012 WL 2152815, at
* 4 (“[A] cognizable informational injury must be distinct from a mere procedural
injury.”) (internal quotation omitted).  In Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.2d
1251 (9th Cir. 2010), the court found plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a Forest
Service regulation which limited the availability of notice, finding that “Congress’s
purpose in mandating notice in the context of the [statute] was not to disclose
information, but rather to allow the public opportunity to comment on the proposals.”  
Id. at 1259.  In other words, the court found that the right to notice granted the public
a right to process and participation, and not a right to information per se; thus,
violation of the right to notice was a procedural injury that did not confer standing. 
Id.  The same is true of the notice statutes at issue here.  As Plaintiff goes to great
lengths to emphasize, the purpose of the CCPA is to protect consumers’ privacy. 
(Compl., ¶¶ 10-13.)  Thus, as in Wilderness, the purpose of the statutory right to
notice regarding the personal information collected by TWC is to protect consumers’
privacy, not to provide a right to information per se.  As such, violation of the privacy
notice requirement is analogous to the procedural injury in Wilderness and does not
satisfy Article III standing.  
Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that he personally was unable to make a
decision regarding his PII pursuant to the acts of TWC.  Thus, there is no showing
that this alleged injury affected Plaintiff in a personal or individual way. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561 n.1.  In Birdsong, 590 F.3d at 960-61, the Ninth Circuit found that since
the plaintiffs had not alleged an injury to themselves, they lacked standing.  There,
Plaintiffs complaint claimed that Apple’s iPod had a capacity to produce sound as
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loud as 120 decibels creating a risk of hearing loss, however “[t]he plaintiffs do not
claim that they suffered or imminently will suffer hearing loss from their iPod use.” 
Id. at 960.  The court held that “plead[ing] a potential risk of hearing loss not to
themselves, but to other unidentified iPod users who might choose to use their iPods
in an unsafe manner” was insufficient to create a concrete and particularized injury. 
Id.  Just as in Birdsong, Burton does not put forth facts showing that he, or any other
class member, suffered from the inability to make an informed decision regarding his
PII.  Instead, he alleges that all class members suffer this generalized injury.  Here,
the sole named plaintiff has not adequately plead an injury in fact as to him, thus
constitutional standing is not satisfied.  See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 350 F. 3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If none of the named plaintiffs purporting
to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class.”).
ii. Economic Harm
Plaintiff alleges two, similar, theories to establish that TWC’s retention of his
personal information and failure to provide notice caused him economic harm.  To
support these injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he ascribes monetary value to his ability
to control his PII.  (See, e.g., Compl., ¶ 56.)  For his first economic injury, Plaintiff
contends that he purchased cable services from TWC, and TWC’s failure to destroy
his PII and provide notice deprives him of the “full value of the services that [he]
bargained and paid for.”  (Compl., ¶¶ 56, 66, 77, 99.)  The second economic injury
alleges that Plaintiff’s PII constitutes personal property, and TWC’s failure to comply
with the statutes deprives him of the opportunity to control that personal property for
his own financial gain.  (Compl., ¶¶ 57, 67, 78, 100.)
Plaintiff’s attempt to plead that he has suffered a particularized and imminent
economic injury as a result of TWC’s mere retention of his personal information
poses substantial hurdles.  As several district courts have noted, “nothing in the
precedent of the Ninth Circuit or other appellate courts confers standing on a party
MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk    MG   
CIVIL -- GEN Page 14
Case 2:12-cv-06764-JGB-AJW   Document 40   Filed 03/20/13   Page 14 of 18   Page ID #:325
12-cv-06764 JGB (AJWx)       
TODD BURTON v. TIME WARNER CABLE, INC.
BENCH MEMO of March 19, 2013
that has brought statutory or common law claims based on nothing more than . . . an
unauthorized disclosure by a defendant to itself.”  In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy
Litig., C 12-01382 PSG, 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012).  Implicit in
Plaintiff’s theories of economic harm is the notion that if TWC retains his lawfully
obtained personal information, its financial value to him is somehow diminished. 
However, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support that theory either to him
personally or more generally.  Plaintiff cites surveys and academic publications
which show that consumers place a monetary “value[ on] the restriction of improper
access to their data . . . and prohibiting secondary use,” however, these are not
issues here.  (Compl., ¶ 33.)  Plaintiff does not argue that TWC improperly accessed
his data or allowed others to access or use it, but only that TWC improperly retained
his data after it was lawfully obtained.   Thus, Plaintiff’s theory of economic injury is
highly conjectural.  See Boorstein v. Men's Journal LLC, CV 12-771 DSF EX, 2012
WL 2152815, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (“Because the violation alleged by
Plaintiff was not the cause of the purported economic injury, this theory does not
provide Plaintiff with statutory standing to sue.”).  Even if Plaintiff’s theory were
sound, he does not connect these general allegations to facts relating to the value of
his personal information.
Numerous district courts have found that generalized allegations that personal
information has independent economic value are insufficient to state a  particularized
injury for purposes of Article III standing.  Plaintiff must demonstrate that he
experienced a particularized injury to the alleged economic value of his personal
information.  In Low v. LinkeIn Corp., plaintiff alleged that the website LinkedIn
“allows the transmission” of users’ personally identifiable browsing history to third
parties, potentially enabling them to link that information to plaintiff’s personal
identity in violation of several state and federal statutes.  11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011
WL 5509848, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011).  The court held that there was not a
sufficient injury in fact because plaintiff failed to allege how he was foreclosed from
capitalizing on the value of his personal data or how he was deprived of the
economic value of his personal information simply because it was purportedly
collected.  Id. at *5.  See also Murray v. Time Inc., C 12-00431 JSW, 2012 WL
3634387, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (“Murray does not connect these general
allegations to facts relating to the value of his personal information. Murray also has
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not alleged that, if [Defendant complied with the statute], he would have attempted to
sell his information and lost the opportunity to do so.”).
Like in Low and Murray, Burton does not allege that his PII was actually
transmitted to any third parties, nor does he allege that TWC’s retention of his PII
prevented him from selling his PII to others.  Nor has Burton made any showing that
TWC’s retention of his personal information reduced its value to him personally.  In a
similar case, La Court v. Specific Media, Inc., the court found that plaintiffs’
purported injury – that defendant had deprived plaintiffs of the economic value of
their personal browsing history by taking and retaining it from their computer using
cookies – was too speculative to constitute an injury.  SACV 10-1256 GW JCGX,
2011 WL 1661532, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011).  The Specific Media court’s
reasoning applies directly here, where the “Complaint does not identify a single
individual who was foreclosed from entering into a ‘value-for-value exchange’ as a
result of [TWC’s] alleged conduct.”  Id. at 5.  Plaintiff therefore has not sufficiently
claimed that he has suffered a particularized economic injury as a result of TWC’s
retention of his PII. 
Burton makes much of the fact that he purchased TWC’s cable services, unlike
the free services provided in LinkedIn or Specific Media.  However, the Court finds
this distinction irrelevant.  Whether or not Burton paid for the underlying services,
Burton alleges, as he must to support a theory of economic harm, that his PII has
economic value.  Since the Court agrees with many other district courts that Burton
has failed to allege any particularized harm to the economic value of his PII, the
economic value of the underlying cable service is similarly undisturbed.  In
support of his claim that particularized economic injury can be found for paid
services, Burton points to In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705
(N.D. Cal. 2011), where the court noted that a “plaintiff who is a consumer of certain
services (i.e., who ‘paid fees’ for those services) may state a claim under certain
California consumer protection statutes when a company . . . discloses personal
information about its consumers.”  Id. at 715.  However, as the quoted passage
suggests, the Facebook court was discussing whether the complaint sufficiently
alleged a claim under California’s Unfair Competition law, not whether it alleged a
particularized injury for purposes of Article III standing.  Thus, it has no relevance to
the Court’s decision here.  See also Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 111
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(N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing the statutory injury necessary to state a claim under the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act).
Moreover, Burton’s alleged injury that he did not receive the full value of the
cable services that he bargained and paid for is unavailing, as Burton does not
allege that he purchased the cable services in order to secure TWC’s compliance
with the relevant statutory provisions.  See Miller v. Hearst Communications, Inc.,
CV 12-0733-GHK PLAX, 2012 WL 5439897, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (“[T]he
fact that Plaintiff spent money on her subscription does not give rise to a cognizable
economic injury because she does not allege that she spent that money specifically
to secure STL disclosures.”). 
Since Burton has not alleged a particularized economic injury as to his
retention claims, his notice claims must also fail as they are derivative.  That is, a
claim against TWC for failing to notify Burton that it retained his PII cannot stand if
Burton’s claim for retention fails under Article III injury standards.
iii. Retention of Plaintiff’s PII
As discussed above, the injuries identified by Burton fail to establish a
particularized or imminent injury suffered by him.  The particularity of Burton’s
retention and notice claims fails on another front.  Burton fails to specify facts
supporting his claim that TWC actually retained his personal information.
In determining that the plaintiff’s injury was sufficiently particularized, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned in Jewel that she “alleged with particularity that her communications
were part of the dragnet” conducted by the government.  Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency,
673 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2011).  Specifically, Jewel “described in detail the
particular electronic communications equipment used (‘4ESS switch’ and ‘WorldNet
Internet Room’) at the particular AT&T facility (Folsom Street, San Francisco) where
Jewel's personal and private communications were allegedly intercepted in ‘a secret
room known as the SG3 Secure Room.’”  Id.  Burton’s allegations do not approach
the particularity of Jewel’s.  Burton states only that “Time Warner still retains
Burton’s PII.”  (Compl., ¶ 37.)  Burton does not identify what specific items of
personal information TWC retains, where or in what form his records are kept, or any
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information indicating how he is aware that TWC maintains his records.  Without
more, Burton’s allegations are insufficient to identify the particularized injury that
Burton suffered at the hands of TWC.  See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (requiring plaintiffs to “idenif[y] the specific
type of personal information collected, such as Plaintiffs’ home and workplace
locations, gender, age, zip code”); Cf. Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK,
2012 WL 2873847, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (finding that plaintiff articulated a
“particularized grievance” where “Low gives specific examples of the information
allegedly transmitted to third parties when he visited the LinkedIn website”); Fraley v.
Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that the
complaint was particularized where it “contain[ed] specific allegations describing
exactly what information belonging to each named Plaintiff was used by Defendant”
and “how Defendant used that information”).  As noted above, Burton must, as the
class representative, sufficiently show that he is a victim of the alleged injuries of
which he complains.  Since he has not done so, the Court finds that it does not have
Article III standing over the action.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 289 (2003)
(Named plaintiffs representing a class “must allege and show that they personally
have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members
of the class.”).
Since the Court finds that the complaint has not alleged a particularized injury
sufficient to confer Burton with standing, the Court lack jurisdiction over the instant
action.  Therefore, the Court will not address the remaining arguments in TWC’s
Motion to Dismiss regarding the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard or whether
the claims fail as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
without prejudice.  Plaintiff has 14 days from the filing of this Order to file a First
Amended Complaint.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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